GexCon, the gas explosion consultancy, at Christian Michelsen Research has undertaken a layout sensitivity study on an FPSO. The objective of the study was to quantify the potential overpressures for a typical FPSO and quantitatively assess a number of explosion risk reduction measures. This is to aid the development of guidance to designers and legal assessors in order to produce inherently safe designs of FPSOs.
Introduction

Objective
Floating production systems are increasingly becoming the favoured solution for both marginal fields and developments in harsh environments. From an explosion safety viewpoint FPSOs have a number of advantages over enclosed modules.
FPSOs are normally open with good venting of potential flammable gasses and ample explosion relief areas. This will help to limit the amount of flammable gas from releases and reduce the consequences of any explosions. However, FPSOs also have large and very congested process areas that have the potential for large gas clouds and long flame travel distances. This will tend to increase the potential overpressures. Due to the fact that there are limited data available for explosion simulations on FPSOs it is difficult to qualitatively recommend risk reduction measures in view of the above dilemma.
A recently completed Joint Industry Project has shown that severe explosions up to 9.4 barg and above can be generated in a test rig (28x12x8m 3 ) which is significantly smaller than a typical process area on an FPSO. It was also observed in these experiments that the addition of small obstacles such as pipework and scaffolding more than doubled the overpressures 1 . The objective of the present study is to quantify the potential overpressures for a typical FPSO and quantitatively assess a number of explosion risk reduction measures. This is to aid the development of guidance to designers and legal assessors of FPSOs in order to produce inherently safe designs.
The study used an existing CAD model of an FPSO which was imported in its entirety into the explosion model FLACS.
Description of Installation
The FPSO will be capable of producing between 125.000 and 150.000 barrels of oil per day. In addition due to that this particular FPSO was in the early design phase, anticipated congestion was implemented in order to compensate for equipment not yet designed. The principles of the anticipated congestion method is described in Reference 2. The FPSO comprises of a floating production facility with one process deck at an elevation of 33,5m and a vessel main deck at an elevation of 29,5m. However, there are also mezzanine levels above the process deck in parts of some modules. The accommodation area is located at the forward end of the vessel, with the helideck above it.
The import of the geometry from PDMS to FLACS preprocessor CASD has been done to a very detailed equipment level. In this study, all pipework down to 1 inch and all other equipment detail down to 4x3 inches have been implemented.
Figure 1 3D isometric view from the Northeast of the FPSO CFD model
The whole FPSO is about 300m long, 50m wide. Figure 1 shows a 3D isometric view of the whole FPSO and figure 2 shows a typical cross section. Figure 11 and Figure 12 are giving the corresponding 2D views from the side and from the top.
Most FPSOs in the North Sea have the cargo deck separated from the production deck with either a grated or solid floor. In the base case simulations, this deck is solid and gas clouds are located either above or below this deck. Explosions were assumed to take place in the process area of the FPSO. The process deck of the studied FPSO is actually divided in 8 main sub-units.
It should be noted that a number of geometry alterations were made in order to make a more generic process area. Hence the overpressure values presented here are not necessarily representative to the actual design. This generic geometry is used for all the simulations performed within this study.
There is an escape tunnel running on each side of the vessel at the top of the cargo deck level.
The simulation domain is covering the whole area of interest using a fine grid resolution. The simulation grid is stretched up to a 50m extent on each side of the vessel. 
Summary of Scope of work
The main objective of the study is to quantify the potential overpressures for a typical FPSO and quantitatively assess a number of explosion risk reduction measures. Therefore the following points have been addressed and reported within this report:
• Base case simulations on the original FPSO layout using different gas cloud sizes and locations as well as different ignition locations, • Effect of a grated deck between the process and the cargo deck considering different gas cloud sizes at the cargo deck with central ignition (See Figure 3) , 
Base case simulations
The base case simulations are performed in order to determine the order of magnitude for overpressures that can realistically be expected on a typical FPSO. A number of scenarios were performed to get a picture of the sensitivity to cloud size and ignition location.
Scenarios
The base case FLACS explosion simulations performed are shown schematically in Figure 6 . Cloud size and locations and ignition locations are visualised.
Gas cloud composition and location
The maximum gas cloud coverage considered (i.e. 100% gas cloud filling) is actually a rectangular gas cloud covering the process area, either in the process deck or in the cargo deck area. The other gas clouds which have been considered within this study are 50%, 30% and 10% gas filling. Three different gas cloud sizes were considered at the cargo deck covering 100%, 30% and 10% of the total volume of the cargo deck. Figure 6 is giving the approximate gas cloud shape and location that have been used in the simulations.
The FLACS simulations were performed using a stoichiometric gas mixture composed of 80% methane and 20% propane.
Ignition locations
The general purpose of this study is mainly to concentrate on worst case explosions for design, therefore ignition locations were chosen to allow the maximum possible flame path and therefore the maximum expected overpressure level. The ignition point was centrally located in the gas cloud at the cargo deck, and located at 3 different positions on the process deck: North end ignition, south end ignition, and central ignition.
Monitors and panel locations
Five monitor points have been located in each of the 8 subunits (modules) following a basic "5 points dice" pattern. Five other similar monitoring locations were defined in the corresponding area of the cargo deck. We therefore get 10 different monitor points within each sub-unit. Figures 13 and  14 show the 80 different monitor point locations in the process deck and the cargo deck.
Furthermore, we defined pressure monitor panels within each sub-unit, located:
• on the cargo tank top,
• on the deck separating the process deck from the cargo deck. Figure 15 and Figure 16 shows the different pressure monitor panel locations. One should be aware that these panels are quite large (approx. 20m X 15m) and therefore the pressure value on the total panel area is not expected to be very high due to spatial averaging.
Results
In order to quantify the global explosion overpressure level for a given scenario, we choose to consider a so-called "TOP 5 average maximal overpressure". This "TOP 5" value is taken to be the average of the 5 maximum local overpressures observed within a particular scenario. Table 1 gives both the maximum local overpressure recorded and the corresponding "TOP 5 average pressure level" for each of the 13 explosion scenarios considered here this means that the load overpressure will be significantly higher.. Distinction is made between the pressure level obtained at the cargo deck and pressure level obtained at the grated deck.
The highest overpressures obtained at the process deck results from the 100% gas cloud coverage of the process area, together with a north end ignition. Scenario 3 gave an average overpressure of 6.3 barg.
The 100% gas cloud coverage of the cargo deck area with a central ignition is also giving quite a high-pressure level (7.1 barg in scenario 11). This is likely due to:
• a high congestion level at the lower deck.
• a high confinement configuration due to the two external tunnels running on each side of the vessel and the solid process deck.. Figure 17 shows the effect of ignition location for different gas cloud size. It is observed that central ignition is giving a lower overpressure level than end ignition. This is mainly due to the shorter total length of flame propagation.
Effect of ignition location
The maximum average overpressure level obtained in the end ignition case is typically 2 or 3 times higher than the one obtained with a central ignition case: 3.8 barg in average for end ignition and 1.4 barg for central ignition. Furthermore, the larger the cloud, the stronger is the difference observed between central and end ignition. Figure 18 is giving the pressure repartition at the process deck for the 3 different ignition location with a 100% gas cloud coverage. Each plot corresponds to the process deck viewed from the top. Each bubble corresponds to a given pressure transducer, and its size is directly related to the value of the maximal overpressure recorded at this particular location. Therefore, the bigger the bubble, the higher the maximum local overpressures. Figure 19 shows the effect of a gas cloud size increase on the maximum overpressure level by considering the 3 different ignition locations. We clearly see that the global overpressure level is more sensitive to an increase of the gas cloud size in the end ignition case than in the central ignition one. We see for example that by doubling the gas cloud volume (from 50% gas coverage up to 100% gas coverage), we actually multiply the maximum average pressure level by a factor of 2.5 in case of end ignition and by only 1.5 in case of central ignition.
Effect of gas cloud size
This investigation considered the consequences of the explosion overpressures. It is however demonstrated both experimentally 3 and by risk assessment methods 4, 5 that the design explosion overpressure may be quantified in terms of frequency and severity.
The low overpressures on the 10% clouds are due to that the clouds becomes very narrow and thus vent very effectively to the sides. A square cloud would probably give a much higher overpressure.
Layout options considered
Grating of process deck
Scenarios considered
The solid partitioning deck between the cargo area and the process area has been removed from the PDMS model and replaced by a grated deck with a 30% area and volume porosity. We chose to model a thick grated deck because it has to support the total weight of the process equipment located above. Explosion was assumed to take place at the central part of the cargo deck, and we considered two different sizes of gas cloud coverage: 100% or 10% filling of the total cargo deck area. Figure 20 is giving the basic layout configurations. 
Results
As expected, there will be two main effects when adding a grated deck and considering explosion at the cargo deck:
• On one hand, the maximum overpressure level will decrease at the cargo deck by 25% in average when considering a 100% gas cloud filling: from 6.1 barg down to 4.6 barg. The pressure decrease in percentage is even higher when considering the smaller gas cloud of 10%.
• On the other hand, the overpressure level will increase at the process area by a factor of 3: from 0.3 barg up to almost 0.9barg. Figure 20 shows the ratio maximum of overpressure with grated deck to maximum pressure without grated deck, plotted as a function of the maximum overpressure without grated deck. We clearly see from this figure the different pressure levels that can be observed between the two decks as well as the effect of grating which is increasing the pressure level at the upper deck and decreasing it at the lower deck. Only end ignition was considered for the one-wall case and central ignition for the two-wall case. In a full design study one would have to consider both ignition scenarios for both wall cases.
Barrier walls
Recently there have been investigations into barrier methods of reducing explosion overpressures 6 . The work presented here only considers hard and soft physical barriers, however, other barrier types may also prove to be effective. e.g. water curtains etc.
The basic geometrical layout used for this case study is identical to the one used in the base case simulations. The deck between the process area and the cargo area is considered as fully solid and not grated.
Three different barrier wall configuration have been considered.
• One transversal barrier wall with gas on north side, • Two transversal barrier walls with gas centrally, • One longitudinal barrier wall with gas on port side. The subdivisions in the process area are shown in Figure 8 .
Process area
Cargo area
Figure 8
The three different partitioning wall configurations considered within this study
The barrier was considered to be either a solid blast wall or a weak wall with the following characteristics:
• 20m-high "hinged" vent panel type, with a subsize of 1m
x 1m, and a weight of 10 kg, • Opening pressure difference : +/-50mbarg, • No initial porosity and a 80% final porosity.
Explosion takes place at the process deck, and the gas cloud is considered to be either fully covering the process deck area or partially contained on one side of the wall. In that way, we consider two extreme possible realistic gas cloud releases depending on whether the wall is able to contain the gas cloud or not.
Results
The results are analysed by taking as reference the full gas cloud coverage with no wall configuration, and then considering the two following alternatives:
The wall is able to contain an assumed gas leakage, and therefore the gas cloud is partially covering the process deck on one side of the wall only.
The wall is not able to contain an assumed gas leakage, and therefore the gas cloud is covering the whole process area.
The main results are summarised and reported in a graphical way in Figures 22 and 23 . Figures 22 and 23 shows the process deck area from the top, and are considering either a full coverage or a partial gas coverage resulting from an assumed possible wall able to contain the gas cloud. The reference case will always be the corresponding base case scenario with full gas coverage without any partitioning wall. Figure 22 shows the effect of one blast wall configuration with end ignition by considering that the wall is able or not to contained the gas cloud. The figures are giving the average TOP3 pressure level in mbarg, as well as the percentage of variation when comparing to the full gas coverage test case without any partitioning wall Figure 22 shows the effect of one transversal blast wall with an end ignition scenario. The reference case is the full gas coverage without any wall. Figure 22 shows on the left hand side the resulting overpressure when the wall is able to contain the gas cloud and on the right hand side the resulting overpressure when the wall is not able to contain the gas cloud. The process area is from the top. The figures corresponds to the average pressure level (in mbarg) observed in the corresponding area and the percentage of variation when comparing to the full case coverage without wall.
We can make the following observations from Figure 22 :
• The overpressure level always increase on the side of the wall that contains the ignition source. It can increase by a factor of 2 when considering a solid blast wall, and by only 16% in case of the weak wall. The wall is actually causing a stagnation of the flow, and therefore we can usually observe a higher pressure level in the area located just before the wall. In that case, one could consider the weak wall configuration because of a less critical pressure increase.
• The pressure level on the other side of the wall usually decreases with both the weak and the strong wall. In that case, we did not observe an explosion and flame propagation behind the blast wall in case of full gas coverage and therefore the strong wall is more effective than the weak wall for reducing the pressure level on the opposite side of the wall. Figure 23 shows the effect of two transverse partitioning walls with central ignition considering that the wall is able or not to contain the gas cloud. In addition the percentage of average pressure level variation when comparing to the full gas coverage test case without any partitioning wall is shown. The figures are the average TOP3 pressure levels in mbarg.
From this figure, we can make the following observations:
• The pressure level still increases between the walls, where the ignition is located. As observed in the previous case, the pressure increase is higher with a blast wall than with a weak wall (44% for a strong wall and 14% for the weaker wall).
• In the case where the partitioning walls are able to contain the gas cloud, they are also effective in reducing the pressure level on the other side of the wall. In that case blast walls are more effective than weak walls because they prevent the flame and the combustion products propagate to the other side. If the walls are not able to contain the gas cloud, we always observe a small pressure level increase behind the wall when considering the weaker wall. This is because the flame is going through the wall and therefore it is igniting and burning the gas on the other side. The overpressure level observed is higher than the one we would have observed without any wall, and this is likely to be due to a higher turbulence level generating the sudden flow acceleration arising from the falling wall. If the blast wall is not able to contain the gas cloud, then this can lead to two different consequences:
• either the remaining explosion mixture is not ignited on the other side of the wall and therefore, the corresponding local overpressure can be significantly reduced (by 83% in our example), • or the remaining explosion mixture is ignited because the flame is able to go around the blocking wall, and then this can result in a critical situation where the resulting pressure level can get actually higher than the one we would have observed without any wall. We get a global pressure increase of 68% in our example. Figure 24 shows the effect of two transverse partitioning walls with central ignition on pressure level increase behind the partitioning walls. The figure is a 2D-field plot of the pressure level in the process area when 30% of the mixture has been burnt. (View from the top)
No wall configuration (on the left hand side), 2 weak walls configuration (in the middle), and 2 strong walls configuration (on the right hand side) Figure 25 shows the effect of a longitudinal wall partitioning with south ignition on the flare side. From this figure, we can make the following observations:
• Adding a strong separation wall will generally increase the pressure level on the side containing the ignition source. This is expected to be due to the side venting blockage due to the wall and preventing any possible expansion of the combustion products in the lateral area. We do not observe any significant pressure increase on the ignition side when we consider a weak wall.
• If the strong partition wall does not contain the gas cloud the flame can reach the other side of the wall. Both the flame acceleration along the wall, as well as the possible pressure waves reflection along the wall are thought to be responsible for the quite strong increase in pressure level observed on each side of the strong wall.
Main observations
When aiming to add barrier walls in order to reduce the global overpressure level, one should first consider:
• The location of the critical equipment w.r.t. the wall position. The wall should be used to protect the equipment from the explosion and not confine the area around this critical equipment, • The location of the possible ignition source. The wall should be located between the potential existing ignition sources and the critical equipment, • The ability of the wall to contain a possible gas leakage. Therefore, both dispersion and explosion simulations should be run for any wall partitioning assessment. A global increase of the pressure level on the side of the ignition source was always observed. This is due to the fact that the confinement is higher. The increase factor is varying from case to case typically between 20% and 100% depending on the wall configuration considered. The pressure increase on the ignition side is as expected, always higher with a strong blast wall than with a weak wall.
If the wall is able to contain a possible gas leakage then:
• The pressure increase on the side containing the gas cloud will be higher with a strong blast wall than with a weak wall • The pressure decrease on the opposite side will be stronger with a blast wall than with a weak wall. One should then choose between a weak or strong wall depending on where the critical equipment is located. The cost and weight of a strong wall will be very different from a weak wall.
If the wall is not able to contain a possible gas leakage then:
• The pressure increase on the side containing the gas cloud will still be stronger with a blast wall than with a weak wall, • With a weak wall, the pressure level increase on the opposite side will be quite small: typically less than 20% of average pressure increase.
• With a strong wall, we can observe two very different possible consequences depending on whether the flame manages to ignite the explosion mixture existing on the other side of the wall. If the flame does not ignite the explosion mixture, then we will usually observe a strong reduction of the pressure level on the opposite side of the wall (between 40% and 70%). But if the flame does ignite the explosive mixture, then we will usually observe quite a significant pressure level increase on the opposite side of the wall (between 40% and 70%). Weak and strong walls can have the same gas cloud containing capacities. But in case of large gas leakage, with almost full gas coverage, the resulting pressure increase from an accidental explosion is expected to be generally smaller with weak walls than with strong walls. Furthermore, by using weak walls, we can better control the explosion process and propagation by creating progressive venting at specific known location. This is much more difficult with strong blast walls because it is more difficult to predict the flame behaviour when it reaches these walls due to the more higher level of turbulence field that is likely to be generated.
In the study a median longitudinal partition wall was also tried. The observations here were found to be generally applicabl;e to that case too.
Effect of separation gaps
Geometrical and layout explosion scenarios
The basic geometrical layout used for this specific study is identical to the one used before when performing the base case simulations.
The whole FPSO geometry has been divided into 6 sub units (or so-called 6 assemblies into the FLACS pre-processor CASD). The resulting 6 assemblies are fully independent entities and they can be moved around very easily using translations.
• These 6 entities location are shown in Figure 9 and listed in the followings: Two different separation gaps have been investigated with different gap width:
• One gap between units 2 and 3: 5m, 10m, 15m, 25m
and 30m, • Two gaps between units 1 and 2, and units 3 and 4: 2x10m, 2x15m, and 2x20m. Explosions take place at the process deck, and the gas cloud is always considered to be fully covering the process deck area (full coverage included on the gaps and on the different units).
We did always consider the north end ignition I1 (ignition on the turret side and explosion process towards the flare and the end of the boat). The reference will therefore be the base case scenario 1.
Results
The pressure levels are plotted as a function of the "relative" distance from ignition. The "relative" distance from ignition from a given monitor point is taken to be the real distance from the monitor point location to the ignition location when there are no existing gaps between the different units.
Following that assumption, we will be able to compare directly the different gap configurations with one another. Figure 26 shows the percentage of variation of maximum local overpressure as function of the relative distance from ignition, in the case of one gap configuration. Each point corresponds to a particular monitor point location. The main horizontal "No variation" line corresponds to the reference case without any gap.
From Figure 26 , we can make the following observations:
• On the whole we observe a global pressure level reduction due to the gap as almost all the points are located below the "No variation" horizontal line, whatever the gap size is, • The pressure level reduction is varying along the main axis of the boat. The highest reduction factor is observed just after the gap. This is likely to be due to the very strong flame speed decrease observed at this particular location. At this location, we can observe about 40% reduction in pressure level with the smaller 5m gap, and about 75% pressure reduction for the other gaps.
• Then we observe that as long as we are getting away from the gap, the pressure level is increasing again. When considering the smaller 5m gap, we see that the pressure level finally reaches at the end almost the same level as it was without any gap. With the largest gaps, the pressure level increases in a similar way when we are getting away from the gap, and is finally reaching about 30%-40% of the original pressure level at the end of the boat.
• It appears that there is actually no higher pressure decrease with a 30m gap than with a 10m gap. This may come from the fact that once a certain minimum gap distance is provided (about a 10m gap in our present case), the flame will not slow down anymore when increasing the gap size beyond this minimum required distance. The flame speed is likely to have reached then its minimum possible value. Furthermore, whatever the gap size gets, the flame front shape will not vary much and will remain almost plane. However it must be noted that this distance may vary with the actual geometry investigated.
Main observations
Adding a gap between the process modules can reduce the potential overpressure level, especially in the area located just after the gap. This is due to a significant drop of the flame acceleration. This study showed a 40% decrease in local overpressure just after a 5m gap.
Furthermore, there seems to be a maximum critical gap size beyond which the pressure level is not reduced anymore when increasing the gap width even more. In our study, we found that there was no further significant reduction in increasing the gap beyond 15m as a larger gap will not reduce the pressure level any further. This is likely to be related to a minimal flame speed reached by the flame in between the two gaps. Increasing the gap any further will not reduce the flame speed or change the flame front shape.
Summary and Conclusion
As expected end ignition test cases are globally giving higher local overpressure than central ignition cases. We observed a factor 2 or 3 typical increase when moving the ignition source from the centre of the gas cloud to one of its end. Furthermore, the larger the gas cloud, larger difference between central and end ignition. This is typical for open scenarios.
Considering gas cloud size, we have seen that the end ignition test cases were generally more sensitive to gas cloud increase than the central ignition ones.
The general effect of adding a 30% grated deck when performing explosion simulations for the lower deck area was a global pressure decrease at the lower deck by typically 25% for the full gas coverage. The pressure decrease can even be higher with smaller gas clouds: 70% pressure decrease when considering a 10% gas coverage centrally ignited at the lower deck.
Adding the grating did increase the pressure level at the upper deck by a factor of 3, but the pressure level remained quite low (less than 1 barg on average).
The study however did not address the case of a grated deck with a gas cloud in both the cargo deck and process areas, which might be more critical overall.
When adding partitioning walls, we always observe a global pressure increase on the ignition side: by up to 100% in average for a strong blast wall, and by only 15-20% with a weak wall. The pressure level could increase or decrease on the other side of the wall. If the wall is able to contain the gas cloud then we usually observe a pressure decrease on the other side of the wall. The decrease factor is usually stronger with a blast wall (about 80% in average) than with a weak wall (about 40% in average).
If the barrier does not contain the gas cloud then the pressure level can increase on both sides of the wall. The weak wall configuration seems to be more appropriate as on one hand it allows a better control of the explosion process and development, and on the other hand, the possible pressure increase on the other side of the wall is usually smaller than the one that can be reached with a blast wall.
In end ignition test cases, separation gaps are usually effective in reducing the average maximum overpressure level, especially just after the gap. We observed for example 40% pressure level reduction just after a 5m gap and about 75% pressure reduction with a 10m gap.
Furthermore, it appears for this geometry that extending the gap any further as this will not decrease the flame speed any further. We observed similar trends in pressure reduction factors for all gaps greater than 15m.
The study represents not only data useful to designers but also a methodology that can be applied for design optimisation of offshore installations in the concept phase of new projects. Such a procedure relies upon the availability of a suitable preexisting geometry data base (topsides equipment and piping model) that can be easily adapted to incorporate the anticipated features of the final design. No variation
